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I.  INTRODUCTION 
This Essay explains a simple model I have developed that graphically 
charts constitutional doctrine.1  In my experience, the model significantly aids 
students in such basics as identifying the operative “black letter law,” 
determining when and in what respect cases have wrought doctrinal changes, 
 
* Visiting Professor, University of Minnesota Law School; Professor and Norman & Edna 
Freehling Scholar, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology. 
 1. I have developed this model in several of my academic writings as an aid to facilitating 
analysis of some discrete constitutional questions.  See Mark D. Rosen, The Radical Possibility of 
Limited Community-Based Interpretation of the Constitution, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 927, 980–
83 (2002); Mark D. Rosen, Our Nonuniform Constitution: Geographical Variations of 
Constitutional Requirements in the Aid of Community, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1129, 1143–47 (1999).  
This Essay, as well as an upcoming article, see Mark D. Rosen, The Surprisingly Strong Case for 
Tailoring Constitutional Principles, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1513 (2005), refine the model and apply 
it to a broad range of constitutional doctrines. 
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assessing the likely stability of constitutional doctrine, and  pinpointing the 
Justices’ disagreements in particular cases.  The model also facilitates 
identification and analysis of some of the deepest questions in constitutional 
law, including: (1) of what precisely does the Court’s constitutional decision 
making consist of?,2 (2) what expertise does the Court have in undertaking 
these tasks?, and (3) what role might other societal institutions play in these 
tasks? Among other things, the model shows what the bulk of the Court’s 
constitutional decision making consists of. 
Part II presents and explains the model.  Part III displays the model’s 
pedagogic benefits by applying it to many of the cases that typically are 
studied in the basic Constitutional Law course.  Part IV provides a brief 
conclusion. 
II.  THE MODEL 
I introduce the model early in the semester when the students study 
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl Services, Inc.3  The Court in 
Laidlaw resolves the standing question before it by applying a three-part test 
that had appeared in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife4 eight years prior.5  To 
motivate the model, I ask several questions: (1) Given the twin facts that the 
Supreme Court hears fewer than 100 cases per year and that Laidlaw simply 
deploys the approach developed in an earlier case, why did the Court expend 
its limited resources and grant certiorari in Laidlaw?,6 (2) From where in the 
Constitution does the doctrine of “standing” come?, and (3) From where in the 
Constitution does Lujan’s three-part test come? 
 
 2. This aspect of the model’s doctrinal clarifications is consistent with the approaches 
recently taken by Richard Fallon and Mitchell Berman.  See generally RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., 
IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION (2001); Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 
90 VA. L. REV. 1 (2004). 
 3. 528 U.S. 167 (2000). 
 4. 504 U.S. 555 (1992). 
 5. The Court held that the plaintiff must show: (1) “injury in fact,” (2) traceability of the 
injury, and (3) redressability of the injury.  Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 180–81 (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. 
at 560–61). 
 6. I must admit that this question takes some poetic license insofar as the petition for 
certiorari in Laidlaw included questions apart from the standing issue.  Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 197 
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (actual petition for certiorari is available at 1998 WL 34080884).  The 
question nonetheless is both useful for pedagogic purposes and legitimate; because the Laidlaw 
opinion primarily relied on a standing analysis that was based on Lujan’s test, it is important to 
motivate students to inquire what Laidlaw adds to the legal community’s understanding of 
standing doctrine. 
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Here is the model, followed by an explication of the terms that it employs: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Step 1: Constitutional Text.  This term refers to language from the 
Constitution.  In charting the doctrine announced in Laidlaw, the relevant 
constitutional text is Article III’s “cases” or “controversies.”7 
Step 2: Constitutional Principle.  “Constitutional Principle” refers to 
concepts that the Court draws upon when generating constitutional doctrine.  
Depending on the doctrinal field, the Constitutional Principle might be the 
Constitutional Text itself, a concept that is traceable to Constitutional Text 
(e.g., “standing”), or a concept that is not connected to Constitutional Text at 
all (e.g., “anti-commandeering,” the “right to travel”). 
Why distinguish between Steps 1 and 2 in doctrinal fields in which 
Constitutional Text grounds the doctrine?  The primary reason is to show 
students that the role that Constitutional Text plays in the development of legal 
doctrine varies across doctrinal fields.  For example, it is fair to say that the 
constitutional language of  “cases” and “controversies”8 has played a smaller 
role in the conceptualization and development of the law of standing than the 
constitutional language “due process”9 has played in developing the doctrine of 
procedural due process.10  Another reason to distinguish between Steps 1 and 2 
is that concepts that are independent of the constitutional language, and that in 
 
 7. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. at amend. XIV, § 1. 
 10. See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S.Ct. 2633, 2648–49 (2004) (giving definition and 
case development of procedural due process). 
MODEL OF CONSTITUTIONAL TEXT 
1. Constitutional Text 
                      ↓ 
2. Constitutional Principle 
                      ↓ 
3. Goal 
                      ↓ 
 
LEGAL TEST  4.  Legal Standard 
                      ↓  
5.     Rulified Standard 
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fact have implications that vary from the constitutional language, sometimes 
become the primary shaper of doctrinal development and hence are usefully 
identified as the Constitutional Principle.  For instance, during large periods of 
our constitutional jurisprudence, the concept of creating a “separation of 
church and state” influenced doctrinal development far more than the concept 
that there should not be an establishment of religion.11  Similarly, the non-
textual concept that government is limited in the respects it can regulate 
“fundamental rights” has been more directly generative of constitutional 
doctrine than has been constitutional language of “due process” to which that 
concept has been linked.12  The model accordingly distinguishes between the 
Constitutional Text of “establishment”13 and “due process” (Step 1)14 and the 
Constitutional Principles of “wall of separation” and “fundamental rights” 
(Step 2). 
The model pointedly does not identify and differentiate the sources of non-
textual Constitutional Principles (such as structural inferences from the 
Constitution).  I do this primarily to emphasize to students during the semester 
that many Constitutional Principles do not have a textual basis in the 
Constitution.  An instructor could easily modify the model by introducing the 
various sources of Constitutional Principles at Step 1, though this complicates 
matters very early in the semester. 
Let us now turn to the relationship between Step 2 and the model’s 
remaining steps.  The model builds on the commonly appreciated distinction 
between “rules” and “standards,”15 where standards describe the trigger of 
legal consequences in “abstract terms that refer to the ultimate policy or goal 
animating the law”16 and rules “describe the triggering event with factual 
particulars or other language that is determinate within a community.”17  
Virtually all Constitutional Principles take the form of standards that do not, on 
their own, self-evidently determine the concrete activities that are required, 
permitted, or proscribed in particular circumstances.  Rather, the Constitutional 
Principles must be operationalized.  Operationalization can be usefully 
 
 11. See generally PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE (2002).  The 
concept of a “separation of church and state” is less tolerant of the intermixing of governmental 
and religious authority than is the ban on establishment.  See id. at 9–14. 
 12. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 593 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (giving 
case law background of “fundamental rights” and “due process”). 
 13. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 14. Id. at amend. XIV, § 1. 
 15. See, e.g., FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL 
EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 102–04 & 104 n.35 
(1991); Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 (1992). 
 16. Mark D. Rosen, Nonformalistic Law in Time and Space, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 622, 623 
(1999). 
 17. Id. 
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conceptualized as involving the three steps that correspond to steps 3, 4, and 5 
of the model.18  
Step 3: Goal.  Constitutional Principles typically are identified with some 
“Goal” (or, very often, multiple Goals), by which I mean a “broad-stroke 
description of what the [Constitutional Principle] attempts to accomplish.”19  
“The Goal sets the parameters within which subsequent doctrinal development 
occurs.”20  For example, a commonly identified Goal of standing doctrine is to 
ensure that federal lawsuits are brought only by those who properly should, 
namely, only those whose interests are directly at stake.21 
On its own, the Goal is unworkably abstract for the judiciary’s institutional 
needs of having a shorthand method for decision making that identifies as 
legally relevant only a subset of the infinite facts that characterizes any given 
circumstance.22  The Goal’s abstractness similarly does not afford lawyers and 
citizens adequate guidance so that they can conduct their affairs.  Over time, 
the Court accordingly operationalizes the Goal by means of a “Legal Test.”23  
It is useful to distinguish two aspects of the Legal Test, which constitute the 
model’s final two steps. 
Step 4: Legal Standard.  After deciding several cases in a given doctrinal 
field, the Court typically identifies what I call a “Legal Standard” that is to be 
used to determine if constitutional requirements have been met.  A relatively 
small number of generic Legal Standards account for a majority of 
constitutional doctrines; these include balancing tests, means-ends tests (such 
as rational basis, intermediate scrutiny, and strict scrutiny), and, less 
commonly, categorical rules (such as is found in the anti-commandeering case 
law).24  Much free speech law and fundamental rights doctrine employs the 
 
 18. Although “[t]he steps do not necessarily correspond to the chronology” of a 
constitutional principle’s doctrinal development, the steps provide a useful means for comparing 
legal doctrine.  See Mark D. Rosen, Multiple Authoritative Interpreters of Quasi-Constitutional 
Federal Law: Of Tribal Courts and the Indian Civil Rights Act, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 479, 490 
(2000) [hereinafter Tribal Courts]. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id.  Perhaps counterintuitively, identification of the goal frequently is not “what happens 
first in time during the interpretive process.”  Id. at n.43.  Quite often, the first decisions are of an 
ipse dixit nature.  Id.  Once the goal is identified, however, it affects subsequent doctrinal 
development. Id. 
 21. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61. 
 22. Cf.  Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Foreword: Implementing the Constitution, 111 HARV. L. 
REV. 56, 56–57 (1997) (“Even when general agreement exists that the Constitution reflects a 
particular value or protective purpose . . . the norms reflecting purposes such as these are too 
vague to serve as rules of law; their effective implementation requires the crafting of doctrine by 
courts.”). 
 23. See Tribal Courts, supra note 18, at 490 & n.46. 
 24. For a fuller discussion, see Fallon, supra note 22, at 76–101. 
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Legal Standard of strict scrutiny.25  Standing doctrine, it so happens, utilizes a 
unique Legal Standard; Lujan announced that the plaintiff must show (1) it has 
suffered an “injury in fact,” (2) that the injury must be “fairly . . . trace[able] to 
the challenged action of the defendant,” and (3) that it is “likely” that the injury 
will be “redressed by a favorable decision.”26 
As their name suggests, Legal Standards are composed of “standards.”  
Averting once again to standing doctrine, what precisely do “injury in fact,” 
“traceability,” and “redressability” mean?  While the Legal Standard provides 
far more guidance than the Goal, the Legal Standard’s standard-like language 
still leaves considerable uncertainty. 
Step 5: Rulified Standard.  As the Legal Standard is applied over a series 
of cases, it almost always becomes increasingly rule-like.  This occurs because 
cases involve particular facts.  As the cases are decided they become 
showcases of what, as a concrete matter, the Legal Standard requires.27  The 
model refers to the process that invariably accompanies the determination of 
what satisfies a Legal Standard as “rulifying” a Legal Standard or the creation 
of a “Rulified Standard.” 
Most Supreme Court cases contribute to our knowledge of the law by 
rulifying previously announced Legal Standards.  This is true, for instance, of 
the Laidlaw decision, which established that the possibility that a private 
plaintiff could recover civil penalties (that is, money damages payable to the 
government rather than to the plaintiff) satisfied the redressability 
requirement.28  This is a non-obvious rulification of the redressability standard.  
Indeed, Laidlaw’s rulification shows that far from being a merely ministerial 
step, rulification can effectively nullify a legal standard or the Goal that stands 
above it; if redressability were a Legal Standard designed to ensure that the 
party bringing the lawsuit had standing because she was particularly affected 
by the defendant’s action, this Goal is thwarted if redressability is rulified such 
 
 25. See, e.g., Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 774–75 (2002) 
(applying strict scrutiny in speech context); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 762 (1997) 
(Souter, J., concurring) (noting that strict scrutiny applies when government regulates 
fundamental rights). 
 26. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61. 
 27. This process of utilizing case law to make standards more concrete is not logically 
necessary; some say, for instance, that it does not occur in French law. Barry Nicholas, 
Introduction to the French Law of Contract, in CONTRACT LAW TODAY: ANGLO-FRENCH 
COMPARISONS 7, 9-10 (Donald Harris & Denis Tallon eds., 1989).  This process is, however, 
what happens under the United States’ common law method of constitutional adjudication.  See 
David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 877–906 
(1996). 
 28. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Services, Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 187 (2000). 
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that it is satisfied by a lawsuit’s possible deterrent effect in respect of the 
public.29 
Two other important points concerning rulification are worth noting from 
the outset.  First, rulification frequently is undertaken by referring to the Goal, 
that is, by asking which rulification best advances the Goal of the 
Constitutional Principle.  Second, what constitutes the goal frequently (if not 
typically) is contestable.  Both these aspects of rulification are nicely 
illustrated by Justice Scalia’s dissent in the Laidlaw decision.  With regard to 
the first point, Justice Scalia’s suggestion that standing serves (inter alia) to 
ensure that law generally is enforced by publicly accountable members of the 
executive branch30 can be understood as a claim concerning the Goal of 
standing, and Scalia relies on this declared Goal in critiquing the majority’s 
rulification of redressability.31  With regard to the second point, it is not 
axiomatic that the Goal of standing includes ensuring execution of the law by 
those who are politically accountable.  Justice Kennedy, for instance, believes 
that this limitation concerning political accountability is a requirement of 
Article II, not Article III standing.32 
III.  THE MODEL’S PEDAGOGIC BENEFITS 
This Part catalogs the model’s pedagogic benefits, proceeding from the 
model’s most basic analytical clarifications to some of its most subtle and 
sophisticated insights. 
A. Identifying “Black Letter” Law 
To begin, the model helps students identify the operative legal doctrine.  
Students who in the past may have confused the Court’s discussions 
concerning the Goal of a Constitutional Principle with the “black letter law” 
 
 29. See id. at 208–09 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority’s rulification of 
redressability would “permit the entire body of public civil penalties to be handed over to 
enforcement by private interests”). 
 30. See id. at 209–10. 
 31.  
By permitting citizens to pursue civil penalties payable to the Federal Treasury, the Act 
does not provide a mechanism for individual relief in any traditional sense, but turns over 
to private citizens the function of enforcing the law.  A Clean Water Act plaintiff pursuing 
civil penalties acts as a self-appointed mini-EPA.  Where, as is often the case, the plaintiff 
is a national association, it has significant discretion in choosing enforcement targets.  
Once the association is aware of a reported violation, it need not look long for an injured 
member, at least under the theory of injury the Court applies today.  And once the target is 
chosen, the suit goes forward without meaningful public control. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 32. See id. at 198 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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are encouraged by the model to scour the opinion to identify the more specific 
Legal Test. 
B. Determining When Doctrinal Change Has Occurred 
Even for those not inclined to such basic confusions, the model promotes 
doctrinal clarity by pinpointing doctrinal change across cases that frequently 
can be missed by even sophisticated students (and even lawyers).  For 
example, the Legal Standard announced in Lochner v. New York33 directed 
courts to inquire whether a challenged statute was “a fair, reasonable, and 
appropriate exercise of the police power of the state, or . . . an unreasonable, 
unnecessary, and arbitrary interference” with a protected liberty.34  Many 
Constitutional Law casebooks illustrate Lochner’s rejection by means of the 
West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish35 case, but this can be confusing because the 
Legal Standard identified in Parrish—is a regulation “reasonable in relation to 
its subject”36 or is it instead “arbitrary and capricious?”37—does not sound all 
that much different from Lochner’s formulation.  The model highlights the 
importance of being attentive to how Legal Standards such as “reasonable” and 
“arbitrary” are rulified, and it is at this point (Step 5) that Lochner and Parrish 
diverge: Lochner treated the reasonableness standard as licensing courts to ask 
whether they thought the legislature’s decision was correct, whereas Parrish 
rulified the reasonableness standard by asking whether the legislature’s 
judgment could be said to have been reasonable.  While it is possible to 
characterize the Lochner and Parrish rulifications in other ways, what is 
important for present purposes is that the model highlights that the difference 
between the two cases is manifest at the level of rulification of a common legal 
standard. 
A similar phenomenon can be found in the Commerce Clause context.  The 
1937 case of NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,38 which is widely treated 
by Constitutional Law casebooks as a landmark opinion in which the Court 
limited judicial checks on (and thereby expanded) Congress’s Commerce 
Clause powers, grounded its holding in the Legal Standard that Congress can 
regulate intrastate activities that “have such a close and substantial relation to 
interstate commerce.”39  The 1995 case of United States v. Lopez40 properly is 
taught as a reassertion of judicial checks on Congress’s Commerce Clause 
 
 33. 198 U.S. 45 (1905), overruled in part by Ferguson v. Skupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963) and 
Day-Brite Lighting Inc. v. State of Missouri, 342 U.S. 421 (1952). 
 34. Id. at 56. 
 35. 300 U.S. 379 (1937). 
 36. Id. at 391. 
 37. Id. at 399. 
 38. 301 U.S. 1 (1937). 
 39. Id. at 37. 
 40. 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
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powers, but the Legal Standard that Lopez announced for determining 
congressional power over matters that are neither channels nor 
instrumentalities of interstate commerce is a virtual restatement of the 
language from Jones & Laughlin: Lopez’s Legal Standard bids courts to ask 
whether the congressionally regulated activities have a “substantial relation to 
interstate commerce.”41  As with understanding the relationship between 
Lochner and Parrish, the key to understanding the doctrinal shift from Jones & 
Laughlin to Lopez is to focus on changes in the Court’s rulification of what 
essentially is an unchanged Legal Standard.  Among other things, under Lopez 
and the subsequent case of United States v. Morrison,42 if the regulated activity 
(possession of a gun, violence against women) itself is not an “economic 
activity” then it will be almost impossible to establish that the activity 
substantially affects interstate commerce.43 
In fact, the model helps make clear that the Court often introduces 
doctrinal change at the Step 5 level of rulification of the Legal Standard.  This 
might be a judicial artifice to cloak doctrinal change; for example, by retreating 
to Legal Standards articulated in earlier cases, the Parrish and Lopez Courts 
could implicitly claim continuity with precedent.  Viewed less cynically, 
changes at Step 5 might reflect the judiciary’s institutional rule-of-law based 
preference to minimize disruption of precedent. 
C. Identifying the Most Modest Arguments That Can Achieve a Desired End 
In addition to clarifying subtle doctrinal changes, the model’s spotlighting 
of Step 5—doctrinal changes assists students (and, indeed, lawyers) in 
identifying the arguments that can achieve their client’s desired outcome in a 
manner that minimizes the disruption of precedent—an important skill to 
develop insofar as rule-of-law commitments typically lead courts (including 
the Supreme Court) to seek continuity with precedent to the extent possible.44  
Imagine, for instance, that a civil lawsuit were filed against President Bush for 
alleged misdoings that occurred before he became President.  The applicable 
Legal Standard announced in Clinton v. Jones45 is to inquire whether 
permitting such lawsuits to go forward against a sitting President would “rise 
to the level of constitutionally forbidden impairment of the Executive’s ability 
to perform its constitutionally mandated functions.”46  Attorneys arguing for 
the President might suggest that a wholly new Legal Standard is appropriate, 
 
 41. Id. at 558–59. 
 42. 592 U.S. 598 (2000). 
 43. See id. at 609–17 (discussing Lopez). 
 44. See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., “The Rule of Law” as a Concept in Constitutional 
Discourse, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1997) (identifying multiple conceptions of the “Rule of Law”). 
 45. 520 U.S. 681 (1997). 
 46. Id. at 702. 
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but they should not neglect to include the argument most minimally disruptive 
of precedent: that the appropriate Legal Standard is the test from Jones but that 
history shows that Jones’s rulification of the Legal Standard was mistaken. 
D. Facilitating Multi-Case Doctrinal Synthesis 
The model also is useful because it illuminates how cases in a single 
doctrinal context relate to one another.  As shown above in relation to Parrish 
and Lopez, the model helps identify significant doctrinal changes that can be 
difficult to spot.47  Equally as important, the model highlights the phenomenon 
of seminal cases that identify the basic Legal Standard and satellite cases that 
rulify the seminal case’s Legal Standard.  In this respect, the model helps 
students to synthesize the doctrine that emerges from the interaction of several 
cases. 
One example of this is the discussion above concerning the ways that 
Laidlaw helped rulify Lujan’s tripartite test.48  To show a few more, the 
aggregation principle emerging from Wickard v. Filburn49 is best understood 
as part of the rulification of Jones & Laughlin’s “substantial relation” standard.  
Wickard’s principle serves the same function in contemporary law’s Lopez test, 
though the Court has further rulified the aggregation principle in United States 
v. Morrison50 by suggesting that aggregation is appropriate only where the 
regulated activity is “economic in nature.”51  Similarly, City of Philadelphia v. 
New Jersey52 is a seminal case that lays out the two-part rule that protectionist 
state legislation is virtually per se invalid whereas evenhanded legislation is 
subject to Pike balancing,53 and a case such as C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of 
Clarkstown, N.Y.54 rulifies a part of Philadelphia’s legal standard by helping to 
concretely define protectionism.55 
 
 47. See supra notes 35–43 and accompanying text. 
 48. See supra notes 28–32 and accompanying text. 
 49. 317 U.S. 111, 127–28 (1942) (illustrating the principle: “That appellee’s own 
contribution to the demand for wheat may be trivial by itself is not enough to remove him from 
the scope of federal regulation where, as here, his contribution, taken together with that of many 
others similarly situated, is far from trivial.”). 
 50. 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
 51. Though Morrison declines to adopt a “categorical rule against aggregating” in such 
circumstances, it avers that “thus far in our Nation’s history our cases have upheld Commerce 
Clause regulation of intrastate activity only where that activity is economic in nature.”  Id. at 613. 
 52. 437 U.S. 617 (1978). 
 53. Id. at 624 (“Where the statute regulates evenhandedly . . . it will be upheld unless the 
burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local 
benefits . . .”) (quoting Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970)). 
 54. 511 U.S. 383 (1994). 
 55. See id. at 390. 
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E. Understanding Differences Among the Justices 
The model also clarifies the varying relationships that exist among 
majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions.  For example, all Justices in 
Laidlaw accept the validity of Lujan’s tripartite test for standing; none believes 
that standing in toto is an inappropriate doctrine or advocates an alternative 
Legal Standard.56  Laidlaw, hence, is an instance of disagreement at the level 
of Step 5.  By contrast, the plurality and dissenting opinions in the dormant 
Commerce Clause case of Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp.57 
exemplify Step 4 disagreement (i.e., dispute as to the applicable legal 
standard): the plurality opinion adopts a balancing test58 whereas the dissenters 
apply a rational basis test.59  Discord among Justices reaches a pinnacle in 
Printz v. United States:60 Justice Stevens in dissent rejects the very existence of 
the Constitutional Principle (the anti-commandeering principle) on which the 
majority rests its holding,61 meaning that the Justices diverge at the level of 
Step 2. 
Understanding with precision at what doctrinal points Supreme Court 
Justices disagree not only provides analytical clarity but also facilitates 
predictions as to a legal doctrine’s likely stability and provides strategic 
guidance in the development of legal arguments.  For example, upon 
recognizing that all Justices accept Lujan’s tripartite test, a litigator should 
understand that it would be difficult to convince the Court to accept a wholly 
new Legal Standard that discarded the “injury in fact,” traceability, and 
redressability requirements;62 accordingly, litigation energies likely are best 
spent arguing at the Step 5-level of how these Legal Standards should be 
rulified.  By contrast, the dissents in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern 
Pennsylvania v. Casey63 and Stenberg v. Carhart64 show that Justices disagree 
at the foundational Step 2-level as to whether there even exists a Constitutional 
Principle in relation to abortion.65  The model thus helps explain why there is a 
greater likelihood of significant doctrinal change in the context of abortion 
rights than standing. 
 
 56. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl Services, Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180–81, 
195–98 & 205 (2000) (all opinions filed either citing Lujan with approval or concurring without 
disagreement on the point). 
 57. 450 U.S. 662 (1981). 
 58. Id. at 670–71. 
 59. Id. at 691 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 60. 521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
 61. Id. at 939–40 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 62. See supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
 63. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 64. 530 U.S. 914 (2000). 
 65. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 979–80 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 982 
(Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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F. Recognizing Patterns and Variations Across Legal Doctrines 
Importantly, the model highlights important patterns and relationships 
across legal doctrines.  Identical Legal Standards can be found in different 
doctrinal contexts (e.g., strict scrutiny can be found in equal protection, due 
process, and pre-Smith free exercise cases), and some Legal Standards that 
bear unique names operate similarly (e.g., strict scrutiny and the dormant 
Commerce Clause’s near per se rule of invalidity for protectionist statutes). 
Conversely, the model helps identify important differences across legal 
doctrines that can readily escape scrutiny.  For example, the fact that the Court 
most always chooses from among a small set of Legal Standards makes it all 
the more intriguing when the Court adopts a sui generis Legal Standard (for 
example, the “undue burden” standard in the abortion context).66 
Similarly, by focusing attention on Legal Standards, the model helps 
students to see variations across doctrines that demand explanation.  For 
example, why does Chief Justice Rehnquist forcefully advocate a formal Legal 
Standard in the Commerce Clause context67 but reject formalism in favor of a 
functionalist Legal Standard in the separation-of-powers context?68  There 
quite possibly is a good explanation that can be provided, but the Chief 
Justice’s opinions for the Court in Lopez and Morrison v. Olson do not provide 
one. 
G. Legal Tests in Constitutional Doctrine 
More generally, the model focuses attention on the ubiquity of Legal Tests 
in constitutional law.  This is important for several reasons. 
1. The Relevance of Facts.  First, the model helps students to see that in a 
jurisprudence characterized by Legal Tests,69 facts are not legally significant in 
and of themselves.  Rather, a fact’s legal significance is entirely a function of 
the applicable Legal Test.  Consider the case of Kassel v. Consolidated 
 
 66. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 874. 
 67. For compelling arguments that the Supreme Court’s approach in its new Commerce 
Clause jurisprudence is appropriately characterized as formalistic in character, see United States 
v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598,  644-46 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting); Donald H. Regan, How To 
Think About the Federal Commerce Power and Incidentally Rewrite United States v. Lopez, 94 
MICH. L. REV. 554, 562 (1995).  Chief Justice Rehnquist, of course, authored both the Lopez and 
Morrison majority opinions. 
 68. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 689–90 (1988). 
 69. This is not the only type of possible jurisprudence.  It has been argued, for example, that 
early Supreme Court cases utilized a jurisprudence of analogical reasoning from precedent and 
that such an approach eschewed Legal Tests and instead directly engaged the facts.  See Mitchell 
N. Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1, 96 (2004) (attributing this view to 
Charles Fried and helpfully elaborating upon it).  Contemporary constitutional law, however, 
overwhelmingly utilizes Legal Tests rather than purely analogical reasoning.  See id. 
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Freightways Corp.70  Of what relevance to analyzing the constitutionality of 
Iowa’s ban on sixty-five-foot double tractor trailers is the undisputed trial 
evidence that such trucks are as safe as the sixty-foot twins that Iowa and 
adjacent states allowed on their highways?  In my experience, students 
instinctively believe such evidence to be of obvious significance, but whether 
such facts in fact are legally relevant turns entirely on the chosen Legal 
Standard.  Evidence that sixty-five-foot doubles and sixty-foot twins are 
equally safe was dispositive under the plurality opinion’s balancing test,71 but 
irrelevant under the dissent’s rational basis test, under which the legal question 
was only whether banning trucks more than sixty feet in length was rationally 
related to the objective of highway safety (and did not call for an assessment of 
the comparative safety benefits of a sixty-foot limit versus a sixty-five-foot 
limit).72 
2. Normative Criteria for Judging Case Law.  The model’s focus on Legal 
Tests also sheds light on appropriate normative criteria for analyzing Supreme 
Court opinions.  Consider Justice Scalia’s opinion for the Court in the case of 
Printz v. United States.73  The opinion’s persuasiveness must be measured 
against two distinct questions: (1) the model’s Step 2 query of to what extent 
the majority’s arguments substantiate the existence of an anti-commandeering 
principle as applied to state executive officials and (2) the Step 4 question of to 
what extent the opinion’s arguments support the particular Legal Standard that 
the majority opinion embraces.74  Printz adopts the categorical Legal Standard 
that “no case-by case-weighing of the burdens or benefits is necessary; such 
commands are fundamentally incompatible with our constitutional system of 
dual sovereignty.”75  Even if the majority’s arguments justify a Step 2 anti-
commandeering principle,76 it is difficult to conclude that they support the 
Court’s categorical Legal Standard insofar as a federal statute enacted in 1793 
(and still on the books) directs state executive officials to undertake specific 
 
 70. 450 U.S. 662 (1981). 
 71. The balancing test asked whether local benefits exceed costs on interstate commerce.  Id. 
at 670–71.  If the evidence adduced at trial were correct, then the local benefit of Iowa’s 
proscription of sixty-five-foot doubles in addition to sixty-foot twins would have been zero.  
There would have been interstate costs to Iowa’s ban on sixty-five-foot doubles, however, 
because adjacent states permitted such trucks.  The balancing test hence would conclude that the 
interstate costs outweigh the local benefits.  Id. 
 72. See id. at 696 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (posing the legal question as being “whether the 
Iowa Legislature has acted rationally in regulating vehicle lengths and whether the safety benefits 
from this regulation are more than slight or problematical”). 
 73. 521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
 74. For a similar argument, see Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and Limits of 
Law: Printz and Principle?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2180, 2182–83 (1998). 
 75. Printz, 521 U.S. at 935. 
 76. Justice Stevens argues against this proposition.  See Printz, 521 U.S. at 939–70 (Stevens, 
J., dissenting). 
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acts.77  An alternative to the majority’s categorical Legal Standard, for 
example, would be a requirement that Congress can commandeer state 
executives only for compelling governmental reasons. 
Relatedly, the model’s disaggregation of Legal Tests into Steps 4 and 5 
also helps students (as well as scholars) avoid common pitfalls in the 
normative analysis of constitutional doctrine.  For instance, does the country’s 
experience with Ken Starr as independent prosecutor vindicate Justice Scalia’s 
doctrinal approach in his dissent in Morrison v. Olson?78  Not necessarily.  
Assuming that the final years of the Clinton presidency demonstrate that the 
Ethics in Government Act of 1978 was not just bad policy but was, in fact, 
unconstitutional, it is crucial to recognize that the functionalist Legal Standard 
adopted by the Morrison majority could have led to the conclusion that the 
1978 Act was unconstitutional.  The question under the majority’s approach 
was whether the Ethics in Government Act’s limitation of the President’s 
control over the independent counsel “interfere[s] impermissibly with [his] 
constitutional obligation to ensure the faithful execution of the laws,”79 and the 
majority’s ultimate conclusion can be criticized as a problematic rulification of 
its Legal Standard (Step 5), rather than an indictment of the Legal Standard 
itself (Step 4).  Indeed, many of Justice Scalia’s strongest arguments were 
legally relevant under the majority’s Legal Standard,80 and a strong case can be 
mounted that the best application of the majority’s Legal Standard (even in 
1988) would have led to the conclusion that the 1978 act was unconstitutional. 
3. Foundational Questions Concerning Various Societal Actors’ Roles in 
Determining What the Constitution Requires.  The model’s focus on Legal 
Tests helps identify foundational questions concerning the Supreme Court’s 
role in constitutional law.  The model makes clear that much of the time 
 
 77. As the majority opinion in Printz itself recognizes, the Extradition Act of 1793, which 
was enacted pursuant to the Extradition Clause in Article IV requires the “executive authority” of 
a state to cause the arrest and delivery of a fugitive from justice upon the request of the executive 
authority of the state from which the fugitive had fled.  See Printz, 521 U.S. at 906. 
 78. 487 U.S. 654, 697–734 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 79. Id. at 709. 
 80. For example, Justice Scalia stated: 
Besides weakening the Presidency by reducing the zeal of his staff, it must also be 
obvious that the institution of the independent counsel enfeebles him more directly in his 
constant confrontations with Congress, by eroding his public support.  Nothing is so 
politically effective as the ability to charge that one’s opponent and his associates are not 
merely wrongheaded, naïve, ineffective, but, in all probability, “crooks”.  And nothing so 
effectively gives an appearance of validity to such charges as a Justice Department 
investigation and, even better, prosecution. 
Id. at 713 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  Although the fact that Justice Scalia’s formalistic approach to 
separation-of-powers could be said to have yielded the correct ultimate conclusion does not 
necessarily mean that the Legal Standard he championed is superior to the majority’s, one might 
ask whether the majority’s approach can be consistently applied by the judiciary. 
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Justices ostensibly agree that a Constitutional Principle exists (Step 2) and 
concur as to its Goal (Step 3) but disagree in respect of the appropriate Legal 
Standard.  This raises many important questions.  To begin, how does the 
Court know which Legal Standard to use in any given doctrinal area?  As a 
purely descriptive matter, it is uncontroversial that constitutional text alone 
does not answer this; there are no textual hints for most of the Legal Standards 
discussed above (e.g., strict scrutiny, balancing tests), and to the extent there 
are textual hints, the Court almost always eschews the Legal Standard that is 
most strongly implied by the text (i.e., categorical rules).81  Nor do historical 
materials typically point to Legal Standards.  Yet not even the strictest of the 
Court’s strict constructionists argue that judicial creation of Legal Standards is 
illegitimate.  Why not? 
The answer presumably is that there is unanimous agreement among the 
Justices that fashioning Legal Standards to operationalize Constitutional 
Principles is one of the Court’s tasks.  Assuming this to be true, as I think it is, 
what are the appropriate criteria for choosing among the different possible 
Legal Standards?  Remarkably, the Court most often does not explicitly 
discuss this, and in the few contexts where it has, its explanations have not 
been fully satisfactory.82  Given Legal Standards’ ubiquity and practical 
importance (insofar as the chosen Legal Standard often is outcome 
determinative), it is surprising how little judicial and scholarly attention has 
been given to them.  Though this fortunately appears to be changing,83 much 
work remains to be done. 
The model’s focus on Legal Standards also highlights the role that societal 
institutions apart from the Supreme Court play in determining what the 
Constitution requires.  As is widely recognized, many Legal Standards at their 
core are methods for varying the degree of deference that the Court gives to 
other governmental institutions (contrast, for instance, rational basis and strict 
scrutiny).  This fact underscores the role that governmental actors apart from 
the Court de facto play in determining whether there has been compliance with 
Constitutional Principles, for most of the Court’s Legal Tests are at least partly 
deferential to the constitutional judgments made by other governmental actors.  
This in turn raises the question of why non-judicial governmental actors play 
such a role in making such determinations.  What precisely are the institutional 
 
 81. For instance, although the First Amendment announced that “Congress shall make no 
law . . . abridging the freedom of speech,” the Court’s doctrine allows the regulation of large 
swaths of speech, even political speech. See Frederick Schauer & Richard H. Pildes, Electoral 
Exceptionalism and the First Amendment, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1803, 1809–19 (1999); see also U.S. 
CONST. amend. I. 
 82. For a rare instance where the Court sought to explain the precise level of review it 
adopted, see Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 226 (1995). 
 83. See, e.g., Berman, supra note 69, at 92–97; FALLON, supra note 2, at 47–52. 
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competencies and drawbacks of the different governmental institutions in 
respect of answering such constitutional questions? 
4. The Non-Categorical Nature of Virtually All Constitutional Principles.  
The model facilitates recognition of the fact that virtually all Legal Standards 
are non-categorical rules.  This raises the question of how Constitutional 
Principles can be said to be “operationalized” by less than categorical legal 
requirements.  Why, for instance, should the government ever be allowed to 
proscribe political speech? 
The answer presumably is that non-categorical constitutional doctrines 
reflect an understanding that we live in a complex world in which there 
typically are competing considerations.  Furthermore—and this is crucial—the 
competing considerations that may justify regulation of a constitutional right 
need not themselves be of constitutional dimension.  For example, even though 
political speech is subject to strict scrutiny, such speech can be regulated if 
“compelling” governmental interests exist, not only if there are 
“constitutional” interests.84 
More generally, the recognition that Constitutional Principles typically 
give rise to non-categorical rules can helpfully enrich students’ understanding 
of constitutional rights.  Most rights do not cordon off a sphere of activity as 
categorically immune from government regulation but only require the 
existence of better-than-ordinary reasons for regulation and better-than-
ordinary precision in drafting it.85  The non-categorical character of virtually 
all Constitutional Principles is a crucial aspect of our constitutional 
jurisprudence that frequently is overlooked not only by students but also by 
practicing lawyers and scholars as well.86  Dislodging the misconception that 
constitutional rights necessarily give rise to categorical protections is important 
for reasons beyond analytical precision.  Among other things, this 
misconception gives rise to cramped understandings of the government’s 
powers and can lead students (and lawyers) to exaggerate the strength of 
constitutional claims. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The model discussed in this brief Essay aims to help students to 
differentiate among the various components that comprise a constitutional 
holding.  The model facilitates several crucial analytical basics: identifying the 
 
 84. See, e.g., Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (1992) (upholding state law prohibiting 
solicitation of votes within 100 feet of entrance to polling place on election day). 
 85. See generally Richard H. Pildes, Why Rights are not Trumps: Social Meanings, 
Expressive Harms, and Constitutionalism, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 725, 727–63 (1998). 
 86. See id. (showing that scholars such as Michael Sandel, Allan Hutchinson, Charles 
Taylor, and Seymour Martin Lipset have mistakenly assumed that constitutional rights give rise 
to categorical protections). 
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“black letter” law, determining what subsequent cases add to lawyers’ 
understanding of the law, and ascertaining when and in what respects the Court 
has made doctrinal changes.  The model can help clarify in what respects 
Justices differ in their approaches to a particular constitutional question, 
thereby providing tactical guidance in formulating litigation arguments and 
making clear to what extent a particular doctrinal field is stable or likely open 
to revision. 
Importantly, the model focuses attention on the role of Legal Tests in 
contemporary constitutional doctrine.  Attentiveness to Legal Tests allows 
students to see important patterns across doctrines that aid the learning of 
constitutional law.  The focus on Legal Tests also facilitates the recognition 
that sometimes the Court departs from its ordinary practice and chooses to 
sculpt sui generis Legal Tests.  The Court’s ordinary and exceptional practices 
with regard to Legal Tests in turn raise the question of how precisely the Court 
decides on the appropriate Legal Test, what turns out to be a crucial yet largely 
ignored and undertheorized question.  Furthermore, the focus on Legal Tests 
encourages careful thought about the nature of the Court’s role in determining 
what the Constitution requires.  At the same time, because Legal Tests 
ordinarily grant at least some deference to the decisions of other branches of 
government, the focus on Legal Tests also encourages thought about the role 
that societal institutions apart from the Court play in determining what the 
Constitution allows and requires.  Finally, attentiveness to Legal Tests 
generates important insights into the non-categorical quality of most 
constitutional rights. 
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